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One Vote, Two Winners:  
Team-Ticket Gubernatorial Elections and 
the Need for Further Reform 
T. QUINN YEARGAIN* 
 
Historically, governors and lieutenant governors were 
elected in separate elections. This frequently meant that gov-
ernors and lieutenant governors of different parties were 
elected, undermining the democratic legitimacy of guberna-
torial succession. But when New York adopted team tickets 
in 1953, it ignited a flurry of similar changes nationwide. 
Today, most states with lieutenant governors elect them on 
a team ticket with governors. And, since the initial adoption 
of team tickets, several other trends—specifically, trends 
away from separate primaries and toward post-primary se-
lection—have emerged in how lieutenant governors are 
elected. 
Despite the significance of these changes, however, they 
remain largely unexplored by the academic literature. Ac-
cordingly, this Article sets out to remedy that omission. It 
addresses the move to team tickets—including explaining 
why the move occurred when it did, the chronology, and the 
legislative history—and the subsequent adoption of specific 
lieutenant-gubernatorial election procedures. It explores 
both trends and ultimately argues for the adoption of an 
election procedure that maximizes democratic legitimacy.  
 
 *  Associate Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. I am 
immensely grateful to the staff of the University of Miami Law Review—Jose M. 
Espinosa, Editor-in-Chief; Daniel Mayor, Editor-in-Chief-elect; Mackenzie Gar-
rity, Executive Editor; Phillip Arencibia, Articles & Comments Editor; Daniel 
Thwaites, Staff Editor; and Mitchell Abood, Harris Blum, Sean Hughes, Taylor 
Larson, and Tori Simkovic, Junior Staff Editors—for their excellent edits on this 
piece.  
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In U.S. presidential elections, the nominees of the two major 
parties each select running mates to a significant amount of media 
attention.1 After the presidential primaries are concluded, vice-pres-
idential search committees are formed, vetting takes place, and pro-
spective candidates and their proxies participate in behind-the-
scenes wrangling.2 The process ends with a slick rollout of the newly 
minted vice-presidential nominee, their nomination at the party’s 
 
 1 Joseph Uscinski, Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and 
Vice-Presidential Selection, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 58, 58 (2012) (“Every four 
years, not only American citizens, but spectators worldwide watch as . . . presi-
dential nominees discuss, consider, and finally choose their vice-presidential run-
ning mates. The media, both domestic and international, relentlessly cover the 
selection processes preceding the nominating conventions.”). 
 2 Nora Kelly Lee, Choosing the Veep of Your Dreams, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 
2016). 
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national convention, and if everything goes according to plan, no 
harm to the presidential nominee.3 
At the state level, the process is different—and considerably 
more muted. Not every state has a lieutenant governor, and not all 
of those that do allow their gubernatorial nominees to select a run-
ning mate after the primary.4 But when the process operates like a 
presidential election in miniature, the gubernatorial nominee selects 
a running mate to significantly less media attention and, in all like-
lihood, to the apathy of the state’s voters. 
Despite the facial similarities between presidential and guberna-
torial elections, the current state of gubernatorial elections is a 
messy and crowded arena. Governors, as political institutions, have 
undergone immense change since the early days of the United 
States. Although most governors in the original thirteen colonies 
were indirectly elected by state legislatures—either as a formal mat-
ter or from the failure of any candidate to win a majority, throwing 
the election to the legislature—these constitutional provisions were 
amended over the course of the nineteenth century to make guber-
natorial elections more democratic.5 At the same time, lieutenant 
governorships did not exist under most original state constitutions 
and were created for much the same reason.6 The result, as of now, 
is the widespread diffusion of both truly democratic gubernatorial 
elections and built-in successors. 
 
 3 Id.; Jonathan Masters & Goal Ratnam, The U.S. Presidential Nominating 
Process, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-
presidential-nominating-process (last updated Jan. 13, 2020, 7:00 AM) (describ-
ing national conventions as “media events to highlight the presidential and vice 
presidential nominees”). 
 4 Methods of Election, NAT’L LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS ASS’N, 
https://nlga.us/research/methods-of-election/ (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 5 See FLETCHER M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH 
ATLANTIC STATES, 1776–1860: A STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 89–
91 (2008); T. Quinn Yeargain, New England State Senates: Case Studies for Re-
visiting the Indirect Election of Legislators, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 335 (2021). 
 6 See generally T. Quinn Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succes-
sion, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2021) [hereinafter Yeargain, 
Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession]. 
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Some exceptions to both remain. Relevantly for this Article, 
seven states don’t have lieutenant governors.7 Two of those—
Tennessee and West Virginia—have a position that is nominally 
titled “lieutenant governor,” but it’s actually the president of the 
state senate, not an independently elected position.8 In these seven 
states, three of them place the secretary of state first in the line of 
gubernatorial succession and the other four name the state senate 
president as the designated successor.9 In the states with lieutenant 
governors, seventeen states elect them separately from governors in 
general elections.10 These states are primarily located in the southern 
and western regions of the United States, although Delaware, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont are notable exceptions.11 
The remaining twenty-six states elect governors and lieutenant 
governors on some form of team ticket in the general election.12 
Only in a discrete minority of these cases—just eight states—does 
the formation of a joint gubernatorial ticket resemble the formation 
of a modern presidential ticket.13 In ten other states, gubernatorial 
candidates run in their party’s primary with a pre-selected running 
mate.14 The third form of team-ticket formation occurs when 
gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates run in 
 
 7 Methods of Election, supra note 4 (“In three states (Arizona, Oregon, and 
Wyoming), the Secretary of State is first in line of succession to governor and the 
official is elected separately . . . . Four states have senate presidents as gubernato-
rial successor (Maine, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and West Virginia) . . . .”). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id.; Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, supra note 6. 
 12 Methods of Election, supra note 4. 
 13 COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-101(3) (2020); FLA. 
CONST. art. IV, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 3; IOWA CODE § 43.123 (2020); KY. 
CONST. § 70; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.126 (LexisNexis 2021); MICH. CONST. 
art. V, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-619.01 (2021); N.J. 
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-12 
(2020); S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-5-21 (2020). 
 14 ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4; 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-10 (2021); IND. CONST. 
art. V, § 4; IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1-9.5 (LexisNexis 2021); KAN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4003 (2021); MD. CONST. art. II, § 1B; MINN. CONST. 
art. V, § 1; MINN. STAT. § 204B.06 subdiv. 7 (2021); MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
N.D. CONST. art. V, § 3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-26 (2019); OHIO CONST. art. 
III, § 1a; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.04 (LexisNexis 2020); UTAH CONST. art. 
VII, § 2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-202(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2020). 
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separate primaries, with the winners of each primary forming a 
ticket for the general election.15 Eight states use this system of ticket 
formation today.16 The operation of separate primaries effectively 
results in “shotgun weddings” in which the two nominees, who may 
have an antagonistic relationship with each other, are forced to 
productively co-exist for the remainder of the campaign—and if 
they’re lucky, for the next four years.17 
The development of these three different types of team-ticket 
formation aren’t the product of old, well-established state practices. 
Instead, before the mid-twentieth century, no state elected its 
governor and lieutenant governor on a joint ticket.18 Beginning with 
New York in 1953, however, twenty-six states amended their 
constitutions or rewrote their laws to provide for team-ticket 
elections.19 Despite the sudden nature of these changes, and the 
extent to which they significantly altered how gubernatorial 
elections are conducted and how governors are succeeded, little 
legal scholarship has focused on explaining them. The little 
scholarship that has notes, as a background matter, that states began 
adopting team-based elections in the mid-twentieth century.20 But 
there has been no effort to analyze these changes as part of a discrete 
trend in state constitutional law, to explain why these changes took 
place when they did, or to explore what patterns have emerged in 
 
 15 See Sam Janesch, Former Lt. Govs. Cawley, Jubelirer, Singel: Change the 
Way Lieutenant Governors Are Elected in Pennsylvania, LANCASTERONLINE 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://lancasteronline.com/news/politics/former-lt-govs-caw-
ley-jubelirer-singel-change-the-way-lieutenant-governors-are-elected-in-penn-
sylvania/article_b9ab1740-c986-11e7-9619-13ec733a21c5.html. 
 16 ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 9-181 (2020); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2; MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXVI; 
N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-104 (Con-
sol. 2020); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 3; WIS. STAT. § 8.16(6) 
(2020). 
 17 See, e.g., Janesch, supra note 15. 
 18 Single Ballot Amendment Up to Voters, ITHACA J., Oct. 31, 1945, at 16 
(“This [amendment] will if adopted make New York the first state in the union to 
conform to the existing method of electing our president and vicepresident by a 
single vote.”). 
 19 Infra Part I.A. 
 20 See, e.g., Travis Lynch, Comment, The Problem with the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor: A Legislative or Executive Position Under the Separation of Powers 
Clause, 84 MISS. L.J. 87, 97 (2015). 
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the development of specific types of team-ticket elections. The 
adoption of team tickets, along with the development of the three 
different methods of forming them, represent significant, and as yet 
underdiscussed, changes in state constitutional law. This Article 
explores these changes in detail and ultimately argues that team-
ticket gubernatorial elections should be both widely adopted and 
reformed to ensure that the will of the electorate is reflected in the 
winning ticket’s composition. 
The first three Parts of this Article analyze the legal history of 
how team tickets have been adopted. Part I focuses on the adoption 
of team tickets in the first place, beginning with New York in 1953. 
It explores how state constitutional amendments (and similar 
changes in newly drafted state constitutions) providing for team-
ticket gubernatorial elections proliferated throughout the country in 
such a short period of time. Additionally, it seeks to explain why 
these changes took place when they did. Then, Part II provides a 
practical follow-up to Part I by exploring the legislative history of 
how these constitutional amendments were drafted and what 
arguments were advanced in support of them. 
Part III continues by focusing on the implementation of team 
tickets in practice after the passage of state constitutional 
amendments. It explains how the three different methods of team-
ticket formation were adopted and what arguments were made by 
proponents and opponents of each. It concludes by arguing that, 
following the adoption of team tickets as a general matter, a notice-
able trend in state constitutional law has developed that disfavors 
separate primaries and favors the formation of team tickets after pri-
mary elections. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the foregoing historical discussion 
makes clear that team-ticket elections, along with how those team 
tickets were created, reflects a careful balance of maximizing voter 
intent and ensuring the smooth operation of government. With that 
balance in mind, it seeks to determine which type of team-ticket for-
mation is ideal. In so doing, it explores the advantages and disad-
vantages of each type of team-ticket formation. Ultimately, it con-
cludes that, while there are compelling reasons for pre- and post-
primary team-ticket formation, separate primaries ought to be abol-
ished altogether. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF TEAM-TICKET ADOPTION 
In 1953, despite nearly 150 years of electing presidents and vice 
presidents on a team-based ticket, no state provided the same system 
for electing its governor and lieutenant governors.21 But by the end 
of the year, New York voters had amended their constitution to do 
just that.22 Within the next twenty years, seventeen more states 
would join it; since then, ten more have joined.23 This flurry of state 
constitutional activity has been, at most, mentioned in passing in ac-
ademic literature. This Part sets out to explore it in greater detail, 
focusing on how these changes have taken place and why they were 
made—and why then. Part I.A. begins by telling the chronological 
history of how team-ticket constitutional provisions were enacted, 
along with the enabling legislation passed by state legislatures after-
wards. Part I.B. then focuses on a broader thematic question: Why 
were team-ticket gubernatorial elections adopted when they were? 
In seeking to answer this question, it walks through several different 
historical trends in federal and state elections and ultimately con-
cludes that the confluence of those trends provides the likeliest ex-
planation. 
A. Chronological History 
In 1944, New York Governor Thomas Dewey proposed amend-
ing the state constitution to provide for the election of the governor 
and lieutenant governor on a team ticket.24 The 1944 legislature ap-
proved the amendment,25 as did the 1945 legislature, and the change 
was presented to the voters in a 1945 ballot measure.26 In the face of 
near-unanimous opposition from the state Democratic Party, along 
with most newspaper editorials, the proposal failed by about 10,000 
 
 21 See Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18. 
 22 N.Y. CTS., VOTES CAST FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS AND ALSO PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 36, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/documents/Publica-
tions_Votes-Cast-Conventions-Amendments.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 23 See infra Part I.A. 
 24 Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, 
BINGHAMTON PRESS, Jan. 25, 1944, at 10. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18. 
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votes.27 Nearly ten years later, Dewey and the legislature tried again, 
and the amendment was approved by a fairly wide margin.28 The 
success of the 1953 constitutional amendment kicked off a boomlet 
of similar constitutional changes in other states.29 
At the Alaska Constitutional Convention in 1955, the delegates 
proposed an electoral system with a jointly elected governor and 
secretary of state—functionally, just a lieutenant governor with 
more official responsibilities, as the delegates explained30—which 
was explicitly based on the 1953 amendment to the New York con-
stitution.31 The convention ultimately adopted the proposal, along 
 
 27 N.Y. SEC’Y OF STATE, MANUAL FOR USE OF THE LEG. OF THE STATE OF 
N.Y. 340 (1946) (noting that amendment received 475,912 votes in favor and 
485,534 votes in opposition). While the 1945 effort was ultimately unsuccessful, 
it may have inspired a similar push at the 1947 New Jersey Constitutional Con-
vention. At the 1947 convention, there was some limited debate over creating a 
lieutenant governor and providing for team-ticket elections. See 5 STATE OF NEW 
JERSEY: CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at 445–46 (1951) (statement of 
the Consumers’ League of New Jersey in favor of a lieutenant governor “elected 
by the voters of the entire State and on the same ticket as the Governor” because 
“[e]ven though he might, at times, be of a different faction than the Governor, he 
would represent the same party organization to which the people have entrusted 
the law enforcement and appointive powers.”). 
 28 N.Y. SEC’Y OF STATE, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEG. OF THE STATE 
OF N.Y. 1284 (1954) (noting that amendment received 844,310 votes in favor and 
663,571 votes in opposition). 
 29 The success of team-ticket elections demonstrated that, if you can make it 
in New York, you’ll make it anywhere. See generally FRANK SINATRA, Theme 
from New York, New York, on TRILOGY: PAST PRESENT FUTURE (Reprise Records 
1980). 
 30 ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, 1 PROCEEDINGS: NOVEMBER 8–DECEMBER 
12, 1955, at 1985, akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Proceed-
ings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021) (“The term 
‘secretary of state’ to many of the Committee members was deemed to be a 
broader description with less restrictive connotations than the term ‘lieutenant 
governor’.”). 
 31 Id. The Committee proposing the new system 
believe[d] that only persons who hold an elective office should 
succeed to the Office of Governor. However, the successor 
should be of the same political party as the governor to avoid 
unnecessary confusion or waste when a vacancy occurs. These 
considerations led the committee to adopt a plan of election 
similar to that in effect in New York and also the same in 
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with a separate provision requiring that the governor and lieutenant 
governor run in separate primaries;32 the entire constitution was ap-
proved by the electorate shortly thereafter,33 and in 1970, the “sec-
retary of state” was renamed the “lieutenant governor.”34 
During the 1960s, nine additional states also adopted team-ticket 
gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial elections: Colorado 
(1968); Connecticut (1962); Florida (1968); Hawaii (1964), Massa-
chusetts (1966); Michigan (1963); New Mexico (1962); Pennsylva-
nia (1967); and Wisconsin (1967).35 Additionally, under the 1968 
Guam and Virgin Islands Elective Governor Acts, which enabled 
both territories to democratically elect their governors for the first 
time, team-ticket elections were created.36 The change continued in 
earnest in the early 1970s with Illinois (1970); Indiana (1974); Kan-
sas (1972); Maryland (1970); Minnesota (1972); Montana (1972); 
Nebraska (1970); North Dakota (1974); and South Dakota (1972) 
following suit.37 From here, the changes slowed considerably, with 
 
principle as the arrangement for election of President and Vice-
president of the United States. 
ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, COMMENTARY ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
ARTICLE, COMMITTEE PROPOSAL 10/a, at 2–3 (Dec. 16, 1955), 
http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/ConstitutionalConvention/Folder%20208.pdf. 
 32 See GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION 103–04 
(2011). 




 34 MCBEATH, supra note 32, at 103. 
 35 MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXVI (amended 1966); MICH. CONST. art. 
V, § 21 (1963); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1967); S. Con. Res. 2, 46th Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess., 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 1083, 1083–84; H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg., 
Extraordinary Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536; Assemb. B. 855, 1st Reg. Sess., 
1967 Wis. Laws 666; S.J. Res. 3, 25th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1961 N.M. Laws 859; 
H.B. 19, 2nd Leg., Reg. Sess., 1964 Haw. Laws 119; H.B. 4501, S. 1st Reg. Sess., 
1961 Conn. Laws 930. 
 36 Guam Elective Governor Act, Pub. L. No. 90-497, 82 Stat. 842, 842–43 
(1968) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1422); Virgin Islands Elective Gov-
ernor Act, Pub. L. 90-496, 82 Stat. 837, 837 (1968) (codified as amended at 48 
U.S.C. § 1591). 
 37 ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1970); MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); H.J. Res. 
4, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 Ind. Laws 2004; S. Con. Res. 4031, 
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only seven additional jurisdictions amending their constitutions to a 
similar effect: American Samoa (1977); Iowa (1988); Kentucky 
(1992); New Jersey (2005); the Northern Mariana Islands (1975); 
Ohio (1976); South Carolina (2012); and Utah (1980).38 
In most cases, the adoption of team-ticket gubernatorial elec-
tions occurred as part of discrete constitutional amendments—but in 
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania, the states 
adopted team-ticket elections as part of broader constitutional re-
writes.39 Similarly, in Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, and Utah, team tickets were adopted as part of tar-
geted rewrites of the state executive branch.40 That leaves fourteen 
states where the changes were presented to voters by themselves—
or with minor provisions tacked on. 
Thinking only about the discrete constitutional amendments pre-
sented to voters (as opposed to the massive constitutional rewrites), 
team tickets were usually approved by wide margins, proving that 
they were largely uncontroversial to voters. The average executive-
branch revision amendment was approved by 59.8% of the vote41 
 
43rd Leg. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 N.D. Laws 1420; S. Con. Res. 46, 67th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1972 Kan. Laws 1433; H.J. Res. 513, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess., 1972 S.D. Laws 15; H.B. 3, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws 
1298; Legis. B. 1160, 80th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1969 Neb. Laws 1428. 
 38 N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4 (amended 2005); H.R. 204, 119th Gen. 
Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess., 2012 S.C. Laws 2969; S.B. 226, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ky. Laws 
437; S.J. Res. 1, 72nd Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1988 Iowa Laws 730; S.J. Res. 
7, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Utah Laws 1318; Amend. S.J. Res. 4, 111th 
Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1976 Ohio Laws 3957; Howard P. Willens & Deanne 
C. Siemer, The Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands: Constitutional 
Principles and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 GEO. L.J. 1373, 1428 n.227 
(1977); see also Ian Falefuafua Tapu, Comment, Who Really Is a Noble?: The 
Constitutionality of American Samoa’s Matai System, 24 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. 
L.J. 61, 89 (2020) (describing adoption of American Samoa’s elected governor 
and lieutenant governor). 
 39 See H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg., Extraordinary Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536. 
See generally ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1970); MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21 (1963); 
MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1967). 
 40 See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4 (amended 2005); S.B. 226, Reg. Sess., 
1992 Ky. Laws 437, ch. 168; S.J. Res. 7, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Utah 
Laws 1318; S. Con. Res. 4031, 43rd Leg. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 N.D. Laws 
1420; S. Con. Res. 46, 67th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1972 Kan. Laws 1433; H.B. 3, 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws 1298. 
 41 Infra Appendix. 
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and the average team-ticket amendment was approved by 63.97% of 
the vote.42 With the exception of Kentucky, the voters of which ap-
proved the 1992 executive branch rewrite with just 51% of the 
vote,43 all these amendments won at least 55% of the vote.44 
B.  Team Tickets: Why Then? 
Team tickets were adopted to mirror the federal model, in which 
presidents and vice presidents are elected on the same ticket.45 This 
much is obvious from the explicit remarks of state legislators pro-
posing the changes, newspaper editorials endorsing the changes, and 
voters in casting ballots for the changes.46 But team tickets in presi-
dential elections were adopted, roughly speaking, in 180447—so 
why did it take nearly 150 years for states to follow suit? There’s no 
easy answer to this question. To slightly preview this Part’s ultimate 
conclusion, the likeliest answer is that the belated implementation 
of team tickets at the state level reflects the glacial speed with which 
lieutenant governorships were created, the adoption of the so-called 
“presidential short ballot,” and a relatively recent change in the 
method of vice-presidential election. 
To start off, the modern history of team tickets in presidential 
elections begins with the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 
1804.48 Prior to the Twelfth Amendment’s ratification, electors cast 
their ballots in a somewhat helter-skelter way. They’d cast two votes 
each, with the first-place winner becoming president and the second-
place winner becoming vice president.49 The election of 1796 
(which resulted in victory for President John Adams and Vice Pres-
ident Thomas Jefferson, who were rivals) and the election of 1800 
(which resulted in presidential candidate Jefferson and vice-
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See supra notes 41–43. 
 45 Infra Part III.C. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804). 
 48 Id. 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (1789) (“The Person having the greatest Num-
ber of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole 
Number of Electors appointed; . . . . In every Case, after the Choice of the Presi-
dent, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the 
Vice President.”). 
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presidential candidate Aaron Burr tying in electoral votes) unfolded 
with such chaos that a movement developed to amend the constitu-
tion.50 
The solution to this chaos was the Twelfth Amendment. Al-
though the Amendment is widely recognized as the beginning of 
modern presidential elections—by which most people mean the 
team-based election of president and vice president51—that result 
isn’t specifically demanded by the text. The Twelfth Amendment 
merely requires that electors distinguish “the person voted for as 
President” and “the person voted for as Vice-President . . . .”52 This 
reflected a method of gubernatorial (and lieutenant-gubernatorial) 
election that was common at the state level, with state constitutions 
spelling out that, in casting votes for governor and lieutenant gover-
nor, voters were required to distinguish for whom they were voting 
for each position. That was the system used in Massachusetts, for 
example.53 And State Senator Barnabas Bidwell, who argued for the 
Twelfth Amendment’s ratification, noted that, by requiring that the 
electors distinguish their votes, the Amendment “will render the 
Constitution of the United States, in this particular, analogous to our 
own State Constitution.”54 
Although the Twelfth Amendment may have been logically fol-
lowed by joint elections, it didn’t explicitly require them—it instead 
required separate elections for president and vice president, with 
electoral college electors distinguishing among the two.55 Accord-
ingly, even though the Amendment was followed by the establish-
ment of team-based elections, this operated as a function of state 
regulations of presidential elections, not as any sort of constitutional 
or statutory requirement at the federal level.56 In this light, it perhaps 
 
 50 Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and 
Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 974–76 (2016). 
 51 E.g., Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, The Twelfth Amendment: A 
Constitutional Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 475, 491–94 (2010). 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804). 
 53 MASS. CONST. ch. II., § I–II. 
 54 Massachusetts Legislature, PITTSFIELD SUN, Mar. 5, 1804, at 2 (remarks 
of State Senator Barnabas Bidwell). 
 55 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (ratified 1804). 
 56 See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 
913, 922–26 (1992); see also Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional 
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makes sense that the Twelfth Amendment was not followed by joint 
elections at the state level. 
It is also helpful to note here that the method in which presiden-
tial elections were originally conducted bears little resemblance to 
presidential elections today. Today, even though presidential candi-
dates’ names are on the ballot, it’s understood as a technical matter 
that votes are actually being cast for a slate of electors affiliated with 
the state-level branch of each nominee’s party and that those electors 
actually vote for president.57 This was originally much more ex-
plicit. In the early days of post-Twelfth Amendment presidential 
elections, voters cast ballots for individual electors.58 Beginning in 
the late nineteenth century, some states began grouping these elec-
tors by party and then by adding the names of the presidential can-
didates.59 By the mid-twentieth century, most states had replaced the 
names of the individual electors with those of the presidential and 
vice-presidential nominees.60 
Simultaneously, the process by which vice-presidential nomi-
nees were selected underwent similarly significant changes. Prior to 
the mid-twentieth century, vice-presidential nominees were selected 
 
Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the 
Future, 43 WM & MARY L. REV. 851, 854–60 (2002). 
 57 See, e.g., The Electoral College, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Nov. 11, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-electoral-col-
lege.aspx. 
 58 E.g., Spencer D. Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 955, 955 (1940). 
 59 See Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, 
Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 
181 (2011) (describing states’ movements away from a system of selecting indi-
vidual electors towards a “true winner-take-all” system involving “short ballot[s], 
which removed the electors’ names from the ballot and listed only the presidential 
and vice presidential tickets.”). 
 60 See Albright, supra note 58, at 958; see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 
228–30 (1952); Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federal-
ism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 195, 209 (2004); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Prin-
ciples and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345, 396 (2001–02); Amar & 
Amar, supra note 56, at 925–26; Williams, supra note 59, at 181. The continued 
presence of this method of elector selection in Alabama makes it near-impossible 
to determine how many votes John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon actually re-
ceived in the 1960 presidential election. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, ROBERT 
KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 220 (2012). 
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in the stereotypical “smoke-filled rooms” by party insiders.61 Their 
nominations usually reflected compromises that gave a defeated fac-
tion of the party a nominal presence on the national ticket—not com-
petence or worthiness as a candidate or even the presidential nomi-
nee’s own preferences.62 But Franklin Roosevelt’s insistence on 
Henry Wallace as his running mate in 1940 seems to have served as 
the catalyst for long-term change in how vice presidents are se-
lected;63 today, the party’s nominee effectively has their choice of 
running mate without restriction and only needs to worry about the 
party convention rejecting the choice in rare cases.64 
Finally, most states didn’t originally have lieutenant governors. 
In lieu of a lieutenant governor, most states devolved gubernatorial 
power to their state senate president—or perhaps to a member of 
their state executive council—in the event of a gubernatorial va-
cancy.65 During the nineteenth century, lieutenant governorships 
were increasingly embraced by states and became the dominant 
method of replacing governors.66 As states were admitted to the Un-
ion with their original constitutions with lieutenant governors—or 
amended their constitutions to create the office—the aforemen-
tioned history of vice-presidential election perhaps likely made it 
unintuitive to provide for a team-ticket method of gubernatorial and 
lieutenant-gubernatorial election. Moreover, given the extent to 
which state constitutional drafters looked to other state constitutions 
in developing their systems of government,67 perhaps an even 
 
 61 See JOEL KRAMER GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE 
PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 47–49 (1982); 
Vice President, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF UNITED STATES POLITICAL PARTIES 
337, 338 (3d ed. Harold F. Bass, Jr. ed., 2020); Vice President, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 777, 777 (David Schultz ed., 2009). 
 62 See SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776–2014, at 205–06 (2015). 
 63 See RICHARD MOE, ROOSEVELT’S SECOND ACT: THE ELECTION OF 1940 
AND THE POLITICS OF WAR 246 (2013). 
 64 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Michael Cooper, Conservative Ire Pushed 
McCain from Lieberman, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2008), https://www.ny-
times.com/2008/08/31/us/politics/31reconstruct.html. 
 65 See Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, supra note 6. 
 66 See generally id. (discussing adoption of lieutenant governorships). 
 67 See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 44–53 
(1998) (discussing the extent to which state constitutions borrow from each other). 
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likelier explanation is that, because no state had a team-ticket-based 
election system, there was simply no model for the idea. 
The culmination of these different historical trends likely created 
a national environment in which team-ticket creation organically de-
veloped in the mid-twentieth century. For the first time in American 
history, presidential nominees affirmatively chose their running ma-
tes, and they then appeared on the ballot together.68 
This explanation is certainly more plausible than the facial ex-
planation given by New York Governor Thomas Dewey in 1945 and 
1953 when he advocated—first unsuccessfully, but later success-
fully—for the adoption of team tickets. His initial explanation, as 
reported in 1944 and 1945, focused on a lieutenant-gubernatorial 
vacancy that had occurred a few years earlier.69 When Lieutenant 
Governor Thomas Wallace died in office in 1943, there was no ob-
vious way to replace him.70 Litigation to force a special election en-
sued, and the New York Court of Appeals ultimately ordered that a 
special election be held.71 At the resulting special election, State 
Senate President Joe Hanley, who had been acting as lieutenant gov-
ernor since Wallace’s death, was elected.72 Dewey argued that gov-
ernors and lieutenant governors should be elected on a team ticket 
because of the 1943 lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy.73 
At first blush, this logic makes little intuitive sense. There’s no 
direct connection between a lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy and 
team tickets for gubernatorial elections. Dewey’s logic may have 
drawn from the practical consequences of team tickets. If governors 
and lieutenant governors are elected together, there is no possible 
way a special election could be held to fill a lieutenant-gubernatorial 
vacancy—one part of a team ticket. Who would vote in such an 
 
 68 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 48–49 (describing how, “[a]s the power 
of the Chief Executive has grown and that of the parties declined, the presidential 
nominee has come to play the decisive role in the choice of his running mate.”). 
 69 Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, supra 
note 24. 
 70 See Issues Are Raised by Wallace Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1943, at 30. 
 71 See Ward v. Curran, 44 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943), aff’d 
mem., 50 N.E.2d 1023 (N.Y. 1943). 
 72 Hanley Elected Lieutenant Governor; Republican Landslide Wins City, 
County, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Nov. 3, 1943, at 1. 
 73 Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, supra 
note 24. 
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election? If a Republican ticket had won the last gubernatorial (and 
thus the lieutenant-gubernatorial) election, would just Republicans 
vote? Would it be a race among only Republican candidates?74 If 
not, and if other candidates could also run, what sense would it make 
to potentially stick a governor with a lieutenant governor of another 
party—especially when the adoption of team tickets was done to 
avoid that exact outcome? Dewey’s implicit argument, therefore, 
was likely that electing a team ticket would avoid a special lieuten-
ant-gubernatorial election in the future and make the executive 
branch run more efficiently in the process. (Electing governors and 
lieutenant governors on the same ticket may also have lent demo-
cratic legitimacy to the idea of using a gubernatorial appointment to 
fill a lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancy, but Dewey did not push for 
such a proposal.) 
But there’s another, more cynical explanation. The widespread 
opposition of Democrats to the 1945 constitutional amendment 
seemed to focus on the disproportionate impact it could have on their 
statewide candidates.75 At the 1942 election, where Wallace was 
elected, the American Labor Party ran a candidate for governor but 
cross-endorsed the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor.76 
The American Labor gubernatorial candidate seemed to pull votes 
primarily from the Democratic Party, and as a result, the Demo-
cratic–American Labor lieutenant gubernatorial nominee performed 
significantly better, nearly winning the election.77 Democrats al-
leged that Dewey’s proposed change intended to kneecap Demo-
cratic candidates in future elections by preventing cross-
 
 74 These questions were raised in Florida in 2003, when Lieutenant Governor 
Frank Brogan resigned, Governor Jeb Bush appointed Toni Jennings to succeed 
him, and state Democrats initially argued that the lieutenant-gubernatorial va-
cancy needed to be filled by a special election. Brian E. Crowley, Possible Brogan 
Successor May Face Vote to Keep Job, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 1A, 
26A. Following Jennings’ appointment, however, the legislature passed legisla-
tion laying out a procedure for filling lieutenant-gubernatorial vacancies, Act of 
June 20, 2003, H.B. 1051, ch. 2003-171, 2003 Fla. Laws 1123, and Democrats 
dropped their legal objections to how the vacancy was filled. Bob Mahlburg, Jen-
nings a Disappointment to Democratic Party Leaders, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 
24, 2003, at B5. 
 75 See Democrats Oppose Single Ballot, ITHACA J., Nov. 2, 1945, at 8. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. 
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endorsements—and perhaps by encouraging third parties to nomi-
nate their own separate candidates.78 At a time when the major third 
party in New York state politics, the American Labor Party, primar-
ily pulled votes from Democratic candidates,79 Dewey’s partisan 
motivation might be a persuasive counter-explanation. 
Regardless of the explanation, however, New York’s successful 
move to team-ticket gubernatorial elections in 1953 was clearly a 
catalyst for subsequent states to do the same over the next several 
decades.80 And the reasons cited by legislative leaders in advocating 
for the adoption of team-ticket elections were persuasive to the vot-
ers of each state, given that the constitutional amendments enacting 
them were ratified by fairly wide majorities.81 But the adoption of 
team tickets only answers half of the question—after doing so, states 
materially varied in how they implemented team-ticket elections.82 
II.  THE DEBATE OVER TEAM TICKETS 
In 1945, as the previous Part explains, New York voters nar-
rowly rejected the proposed constitutional amendment to adopt 
team-ticket gubernatorial elections. Part I explored how the eventual 
adoption of team-ticket elections in 1953 resulted in a wave of sim-
ilar constitutional changes in other states, as well as why team-ticket 
proposals were introduced at the point in American history when 
they were. This Part focuses on a more descriptive query: When 
states were considering these constitutional amendments, what ar-
guments did proponents and detractors make about them? 
Part II.A. begins by reviewing the arguments made in New 
York, both in 1945 and 1953. The arguments raised during both 
elections are reflective of the arguments that would be raised in the 
decades that followed as other states considered similar 
 
 78 See id. (“Parties would be discouraged from supporting a good candidate 
of another party for governor or lieutenant governor unless they could also agree 
on his running-mate.”). 
 79 See generally Alan Wolfe, The Withering Away of the American Labor 
Party, 31 RUTGERS U. LIB. J. 46, 48–49 (1968) (discussing candidates from Amer-
ican Labor Party winning votes in “solidly Democratic” districts). 
 80 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. CONVENTION, COMMENTARY ON THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARTICLE, supra note 31. 
 81 Supra Part I.A. 
 82 See id. 
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amendments. Part II.B. then reviews the arguments made in other 
states. These debates played out with similar arguments as those 
made in New York but, in many cases, focused on state-specific 
contexts and histories that were absent in New York. 
A. The Debate Over New York’s 1945 and 1953 Amendments 
To briefly recap, in advocating for the proposed 1945 amend-
ment, Governor Dewey explicitly tied the idea of team tickets to 
avoiding burdensome special elections to fill lieutenant-gubernato-
rial vacancies.83 This argument, however, was not the primary one 
made by state Republicans, who were the amendment’s chief advo-
cates84—and it doesn’t appear to have been made at all in 1953. In-
stead, in 1945, Republicans argued that the governor and lieutenant 
governor should be of the same party.85 The biggest advantage of 
guaranteeing same-party alignment was that, in the event of a gu-
bernatorial vacancy, executive power would not devolve to a mem-
ber of the opposite party.86 In making this argument, Republicans 
could not point to a specific example in which this had happened. 
The last time that a governor and lieutenant governor of different 
parties had been elected was 1924, when Democrat Alfred Smith 
was re-elected as governor and Republican Seymour Lowman nar-
rowly defeated Smith’s lieutenant governor for re-election.87 After 
the 1953 amendment was approved, it was noted in passing that, 
during the Smith–Lowman administration, Smith “stayed pretty 
close to the state” and avoided leaving to prevent Lowman from ex-
ercising power.88 Had Lowman been able to do so, the Republican 
 
 83 Supra Part I.B. 
 84 See GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, ITHACA J., Nov. 1, 1945, at 15. 
 85 Id.; see Legislature Approves Bill for Joint Election of 2 Top Executives, 
supra note 24. 
 86 Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18. 
 87 Donald O. Cunnion, Legislature Adopts Dewey Plan to Elect Governor, 
Lieutenant of Same Party, GLENS FALLS POST-STAR, Jan. 26, 1944, at 1; see How-
ard A. Shiebler, Coolidge Popular Vote May Exceed Harding’s; Split Power in 
Albany, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 6, 1924, at 1–2 (noting that Lieutenant 
Governor George Lunn lost re-election to Seymour Lowman). 
 88 BI-PARTISAN, Pay Raises Will Lure Candidates, PRESS & SUN-BULL. 
(Binghamton, N.Y.), Dec. 20, 1953, at 9–A (“The late Alfred E. Smith served as 
governor one term with a lieutenant-governor of the opposite political party. As a 
result, Smith stayed pretty close to the state.”). 
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Party would have enjoyed, however briefly, total control over the 
state government. Some of the advocates noted in passing that team-
ticket gubernatorial elections would be in line with how presidential 
elections were conducted, but this didn’t seem to be a major focus 
of the campaign.89 
Opponents of the amendment—who were mainly, but not exclu-
sively, Democrats—primarily emphasized the value of voter choice. 
Their arguments emphasized the importance of the electorate’s right 
to vote for lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates of their choosing, a 
choice that was ostensibly made independently of their choice in the 
gubernatorial election.90 Perhaps drawing inspiration from the his-
torical method by which vice presidents were elected, they argued 
that “the lieutenant governor could be a choice of the [gubernatorial 
nominee] rather than of the voters.”91 Building on this argument, 
they suggested that the team-ticket method of election would allow 
party bosses to make a “purely political choice for lieutenant gover-
nor”92 and that “some party hack or out-and-out crook”93 or “‘some 
rich dope, by paying enormous party contributions,’ could get on the 
ticket as lieutenant governor.”94 And if an incompetent or unquali-
fied choice were made, voters “could not discriminate” among the 
lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates and, in voting for governor, 
would be forced to accept a disfavored lieutenant-gubernatorial 
nominee.95 An unqualified nomination would have been less likely 
under the then-existing system—which they argued “has worked 
 
 89 See Cunnion, supra note 87 (noting that Republican State Assembly Ma-
jority Leader Irwin M. Ives, “emphasized that the President and Vice President of 
the United States are elected jointly.”). 
 90 See id. 
 91 Up for Decision on Tuesday, PRESS & SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.), 
Nov. 3, 1945, at 6. 
 92 GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, supra note 84. 
 93 Yes—Yes—No—Yes—Yes—Yes—Yes—Yes—No, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 
26, 1953, at 29. 
 94 GOP Leader Favors Single Ballot, supra note 84; see also Single Ballot 
Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18 (“The opponents contend the joining bal-
lot for these two offices would deprive the people of any choice in their selection 
of a lieutenant governor and that a merely rich or unfit candidate for lieutenant 
governor, or vice versa, could be elected on the strength of his co-partner’s ability 
or popularity.”). 
 95 Cunnion, supra note 87; Vote ‘No’ on Amendment No. 3, ONEONTA STAR, 
Oct. 23, 1953, at 4. 
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well and should be continued”96—because “political parties are un-
der a strong obligation to nominate persons of character and ability 
for the office of lieutenant-governor since the voters have the power 
to cross party lines in making their choice.”97 
B. Debates in Other States 
The arguments made in 1945 and 1953 accurately foreshadowed 
the arguments that would be made in the decades that followed. Ad-
vocates of team-ticket amendments emphasized the importance of 
ensuring that the governor and lieutenant governor were of the same 
political party.98 In many states, however, these arguments focused 
on specific examples from state history when governors and 
 
 96 Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18. 
 97 E.g., First Four Amendments, KINGSTON DAILY FREEMAN, Oct. 19, 1953, 
at 4. 
 98 See, e.g., LEGIS. COUNCIL COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., LEGISLATIVE 
PROCEDURES IN COLORADO, Research Publ’n No. 119, at 36 (Dec. 1966) [herein-
after LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN COLORADO]; Amendments Facing Minneso-
tans on Nov. 7 Ballot, ST. CLOUD DAILY TIMES, Nov. 2, 1972, at 19; Willard 
Baird, The Proposed Constitution, HOLLAND EVENING SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 1963, 
at 6; Dick Cowen, Key Feature of Question 4-A: Allowing Governor Second 
Term, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, May 8, 1967, at 29; Al Cross, Two Teams: 
More Players and Issues, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 5, 1992, at 1, 9; John 
Elmer, 1970 Constitution Proposes Added Powers for Governor, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
17, 1970, at 2; Five Amendments to Be on Ballot, BRIDGEPORT POST, Mar. 8, 1962, 
at 12; Governor and Lieutenant Governor Would Run for Election as a Team, 
PALLADIUM-ITEM (Richmond, Ind.), Oct. 23, 1974, at 4; Will Harrison, Nobody’s 
Acceptable for State’s Dough on Ute Dam, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS, June 27, 
1962, at 4; Dick Herman, ‘Team Ballot’ for Governor, Lieutenant Governor 
Urged, LINCOLN EVENING J. & NEB. STATE J., Aug. 24, 1970, at 8; Editorial, Issue 
1—Yes, J. HERALD (Dayton, Ohio), May 26, 1976, at 4; Editorial, Proposition 1 
Deserves ‘Yes’, HERALD (Provo, Utah), Nov. 2, 1980, at 44; Pros and Cons Re-
capped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 2, 1964, at 1–A; 
Strange Bedfellows Indeed, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1972, at 7; Editorial, 
Team Approach, Yes, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1988, at 8A; Editorial, 
Vote ‘Yes’ on Question No. 1, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1966, at 14; Editorial, Vote 
‘Yes’ on Question 5, JANESVILLE DAILY GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1967, at 6; William 
C. Wertz, Amendment ‘E’ Passage Would Affect State Terms, ARGUS-LEADER 
(Sioux Falls, S.D.), Oct. 10, 1970, at 7; J.D. Wilson, Measure Would End Split 
Ticket, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 18, 1974, at 3. 
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lieutenant governors of different parties had served99—in some 
cases, quite frequently.100 These arguments were particularly poign-
ant in states that, at the time the amendments were proposed or voted 
on, actually had such a party split in their executive branch101 or that 
had experienced a party switch following a gubernatorial va-
cancy.102 But these arguments went beyond the mere claim that 
 
 99 Amendments Facing Minnesotans on Nov. 7 Ballot, supra note 98; Ray 
Broussard, Three Proposed Amendments to Face Voters at General Election, 
COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH, Sept. 6, 1968, at 30; Cowen, supra note 
98; Harrison, supra note 98; Strange Bedfellows Indeed, supra note 98; Three 
Amendments, CALL-LEADER (Elwood, Ind.), Oct. 26, 1974, at 1, 9. 
 100 For example, in 1967 a Wisconsin newspaper pointed out the following: 
There have been [ten] times in the state’s history where the vot-
ers have elected a governor of one party and a lieutenant gov-
ernor of another party. This has happened three times in the last 
four elections. On two occasions, the governor has died in of-
fice and the voters wound up with a governor of the party which 
had been defeated in the last gubernatorial election. 
Vote ‘Yes’ on Question 5, supra note 98; see also Steve Wilson, Tandem Issue: 
Two Officials for Only One Vote, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 16, 1976, at B-2 (“Since 
1856, there have been [ten] times when a governor served with a lieutenant gov-
ernor of another political party—including the state’s present governor, James A. 
Rhodes. Rhodes is a Republican and Celeste is a Democrat.”). 
 101 JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818–1970, at 157 
(1972) (“This change was clearly a reaction to the situation at the time the dele-
gates were meeting, when a Republican governor and a Democratic lieutenant 
governor were in office.”); Proposition 1 Deserves ‘Yes’, supra note 98; Wilson, 
supra note 100. In Colorado, for example, the 1956 election produced a narrow 
Democratic victory in the gubernatorial election and an even narrower Republican 
victory in the lieutenant-gubernatorial election. My great-grand uncle, State Sen-
ator Sam Taylor, was the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor. See 
McNichols Let Him Down, Sam Taylor Complains, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, 
Nov. 9, 1956, at 6. Several years later, Taylor proposed a constitutional amend-
ment to provide for the joint election of both offices, but it was rejected by the 
State Senate. See Civil Service Amendment Narrowly OKd by House, FORT 
COLLINS COLORADOAN, Feb. 8, 1960, at 1. When the amendment adopted by Col-
orado voters in 1968 was approved by the state legislature, however, Taylor was 
not one of the legislators responsible for its passage—although he did vote for it. 
See S. JOURNAL, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., at S. CON. RES. 6 (Colo. 1967). 
 102 Jim Davis, Editorial, For Issue 1, Against Issue 2, DAILY REP. (Dover, 
Ohio), May 22, 1976, at A-4 (“On three occasions, the lieutenant governor suc-
ceeding the governor was from a different party—the most recent being John 
Brown, who replaced Frank Lausche for a brief time in 1957 when Lausche re-
signed to become U.S. senator.”); Vote ‘Yes’ on Question 5, supra note 98. 
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avoiding these sorts of party splits was desirable; they also focused 
on the tangible negative impacts that party splits had. Advocates 
noted that when governors left the state, and lieutenant governors of 
the opposite party acted as governor in their absence, they made de-
cisions and appointments that were out-of-step with the elected gov-
ernor’s position.103 They also argued that governors were more 
likely to include their lieutenant governors in policymaking when 
they were of the same party104—especially when they were elected 
together—citing examples in which governors had altogether ig-
nored their ostensible deputies.105 This, in turn, led to an argument 
rooted in fiscal responsibility, specifically that a more involved lieu-
tenant governor with actual responsibilities would allow taxpayers 
to “get better value for the dollars spent on the lieutenant governor’s 
position.”106 In some states, these changes were adopted in tandem 
with other constitutional modifications that sought to reduce the 
number of statewide elected officials107—a belated paean to the 
 
 103 E.g., Broussard, supra note 99 (“Those such as Love are disenchanted with 
the present setup because they feel whenever they leave the state a lieutenant gov-
ernor from the opposing party will run rampant making appointments and the 
like.”); Keith Schonrock, Pairing of Offices Seen as Basic Need, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Apr. 22, 1962, at 3B (“In some instances of political division between 
the governor and the lieutenant governor, the governor has actually been afraid to 
leave the state, especially when legislative sessions were going, lest his politi-
cally-inimical deputy upset some policy or patronage applecarts.”); Glenn Urban, 
Executive Team from Same Party Is Decision of Voters Tuesday, COLO. SPRINGS 
GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH, Oct. 31, 1968, at 10–D (noting that, during Governor 
Love’s administration, Lieutenant Governor Hogan filled a county commission 
vacancy with a Democrat to replace a Republican). 
 104 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES IN COLORADO, supra note 98, at 36; 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor Would Run for Election as a Team, supra 
note 98; Pros and Cons Recapped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, supra note 98. 
 105 E.g., Davis, supra note 102 (“[Lieutenant Governor] Celeste, who is out 
campaigning for the team effort, confesses he has hardly talked to Gov. Rhodes 
since they both took office [seventeen] months ago. Before that, John Brown’s 
contact with Gilligan was even less.”); Team Approach, Yes, supra note 98 (“Lt. 
Gov. Jo Ann Zimmerman, a Democrat, can barely remember the last time she had 
a talk with Republican Gov. Terry Branstad . . . . Branstad would make the lieu-
tenant governor wait six weeks for an appointment.”). 
 106 Team Approach, Yes, supra note 98; see also Davis, supra note 102. 
 107 E.g., Referenda: Question No. One, FITCHBURG SENTINEL (Fitchburg, 
Mass.), Oct. 19, 1966, at 6; James P. Warnick, Short Ballot Battle Has Been Long 
Fight, DECATUR REV. (Decatur, Ill.), Mar. 23, 1970, at 8. 
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“short ballot” movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.108 Finally, many supporters of these amendments argued 
that their states should join the federal government, along with many 
other states, in adopting team tickets.109 
Opponents, meanwhile, largely relied on the voter-choice argu-
ment raised by New York Democrats in 1945 and 1953: if elections 
were joined, voters were deprived of their ability to elect the most 
qualified candidate.110 One Ohio state representative noted that 
avoiding a party split in the state executive branch, one of the main 
features proponents endorsed, might be contrary to what voters in-
tended: “It is just possible that the voters did just exactly what they 
wanted to do in electing a governor of one party and lieutenant gov-
ernor of another party.”111 In support of this argument, some sug-
gested that having a governor and lieutenant governor of different 
parties was beneficial because it could provide a check on the gov-
ernor’s power112—although, beyond “keeping the governors on the 
 
 108 See Tyler Yeargain, The Legal History of State Legislative Vacancies and 
Temporary Appointments, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 564, 623–25 (2020) [hereinafter Year-
gain, Legal History] (discussing “short ballot” movement). 
 109 E.g., MICH. CONST. CONVENTION, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 452 (1961); Broussard, supra note 99; Five Amendments to Be on 
Ballot, supra note 98; Pros and Cons Recapped for Tomorrow’s Ballot, supra 
note 98. 
 110 LEGIS. COUNCIL COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., AN ANALYSIS OF 1968 BALLOT 
PROPOSALS, Rsch. Publ’n No. 133, at 2–3 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 COLORADO 
BALLOT PROPOSALS ANALYSIS]; Constitutional Amendment OK’d for November 
Ballot, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Mar. 10, 1964, at 17; Ex-State Officials Differ on 
Amendment, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Oct. 27, 1972, at 7B; Maynard Leahey, Ques-
tions 1 and 2, NORTH ADAMS TRANSCRIPT (North Adams, Mass.), Nov. 2, 1966, 
at 5; Three Amendments, supra note 99; Brian Usher, Ohio Voters to Decide on 
Pairing Top Offices, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 29, 1976, at B4; Voters Facing Eight 
Constitutional Referenda, DAILY NORTHWESTERN (Oshkosh, Wis.), Mar. 17, 
1967, at 4. 
 111 Usher, supra note 110; see also Joint Election Hottest Issue, COSHOCTON 
TRIB., May 30, 1976, at 3 (“Opponents argue that Issue 1 would eliminate the 
right of the voters to pick the lieutenant governor independently. They claim this 
right has been notably exercised in the last two statewide elections when the voters 
chose governors and lieutenant governors of opposite parties.”). 
 112 For example, an Indiana newspaper described opponents’ beliefs in the fol-
lowing way: 
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job and not running around outside the state” for fear of what the 
lieutenant governor might do in their absence,113 it’s not quite clear 
how lieutenant governors could exercise a meaningful check. Oppo-
nents of the amendments also argued that separate elections encour-
aged stronger candidates to run for lieutenant governor.114 Because 
team-ticket elections allowed the gubernatorial nominees—or their 
parties—to artificially form a ticket, opponents argued that lieuten-
ant-gubernatorial nominees would be selected for their ability to bal-
ance the ticket, not their competence.115 And one state senator in 
Iowa argued that the selection of running mates by gubernatorial 
nominees would reduce the number of women nominated for the 
office, noting that “[t]he majority of women lieutenant governors 
have been people who have put themselves forward . . . .”116 
 
Opponents of the amendment, believe that it might be healthy 
to have a Governor and Lieutenant Governor of opposite polit-
ical beliefs. That would provide an effective system of checks 
and balances. The opponents also worry that the amendment 
would concentrate too much power in the Governor’s hands and 
reduce the Lieutenant Governor to a ‘rubber stamp’ supporter 
of the Governor’s point of view. 
Three Amendments, supra note 99. 
 113 Harrison, supra note 98. This argument falls under its own weight, how-
ever—if having a lieutenant governor of the opposite party serves as a meaningful 
check on the governor by keeping her from leaving the state, that seems to suggest 
that undesirable consequences would follow a gubernatorial vacancy. 
 114 See 1968 COLORADO BALLOT PROPOSALS ANALYSIS, supra note 110110, 
at 2–3. 
 115 E.g., Editorial, Measures on the Nov. 5 Ballot, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 25, 
1974, at 4; David Watson, Legislators Blister Lieutenant Governor Concept, 
TAMPA TRIB., July 12, 1968, at 1, 12–A; see also Richard Pyle, One Post Nobody 
Wants, But Most Would Accept, PORT HURON TIMES HERALD, Dec. 29, 1963, at 
3. 
 116 Editorial, Streamline Officials, Too, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Feb. 29, 
1988, at 5A. As an empirical statement, this is false. Iowa had a female lieutenant 
governor when the team-ticket amendment was approved, which initiated a three-
decade streak of female lieutenant governors, which only ended when Lieutenant 
Governor Kim Reynolds became Governor in 2017 upon the governor’s resigna-
tion. Eric Ostermeier, Number of Female Lieutenant Governors to Increase After 
2016, SMART POL. (Aug. 7, 2016), https://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpoli-
tics/2016/08/07/number-of-female-lieutenant-governors-to-increase-after-2016/; 
Jason Noble, Kim Reynolds Becomes Iowa’s First Female Governor, DES MOINES 
REG. (May 24, 2017, 7:07 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/
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Several additional points are worth noting. First, because most 
constitutional amendments providing for team-ticket gubernatorial 
elections did not specify how the team tickets would be formed,117 
the aforementioned arguments played out as a choose-your-own-ad-
venture novel. Depending on the method of ticket formation, the ar-
guments for or against the amendments would be mitigated entirely. 
For example, if a state legislature’s enabling act provided for sepa-
rate primaries, the notion that lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees 
would be selected as mere ticket balancers, and that voters would 
have no say in the selection, would be entirely untrue. On the other 
hand, some of the arguments in favor of team tickets would be sim-
ilarly undermined by separate primaries. If gubernatorial and lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial candidates were nominated in separate prima-
ries, antagonistic candidates could emerge as their party’s respective 
nominees, making collaboration significantly less likely.118 Second, 
once a number of states had adopted team-ticket amendments, for-
mal opposition seemed to fade.119 In many states, the Democratic 
and Republican parties both endorsed—either expressly or tacitly—
the amendments120 and opposition was largely nonexistent.121 This 
 
story/news/2017/05/24/kim-reynolds-takes-oath-office-becomes-iowas-first-fe-
male-governor/341857001/. Moreover, the best available political science re-
search on the subject has shown that lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees are more 
likely to be female, not less, if selected by gubernatorial nominees. See Valerie 
M. Hennings & R. Urbatsch, Gender, Partisanship, and Candidate-Selection 
Mechanisms, 16 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 290, 299–305 (2016). 
 117 Iowa is one of the only examples in which, because the state legislature 
passed an enabling act before the constitutional amendment passed, voters knew 
exactly what they were voting for. See Act of Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa 
Laws 166. 
 118 Daniel J. Foley, Judge Recommends Functions for Office, MISSOULIAN 
(Missoula, Mont.), Feb. 2, 1972, at 8; see also Team Approach, Yes, supra note 
98 (“In other words, the team approach doesn’t guarantee that the governor and 
the lieutenant governor will be compatible in office.”). 
 119 See, e.g., Linda Lantor, Lieutenant Governor Amendments Big Winners, 
DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 1988, at 8M; Elon Torrence, Kansas Would Elect Gu-
bernatorial Team, GARDEN CITY TELEGRAM, Nov. 1, 1972, at 12. 
 120 E.g., Iowa Political Leaders Back Gubernatorial Team Proposal, SIOUX 
CITY J., Sept. 30, 1988, at A8; Torrence, supra note 119; Vote ‘Yes’ on Question 
No. 1, supra note 98. 
 121 See Lantor, supra note 119; Torrence, supra note 119. 
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weakening of the opposition is in line with the generally high voter 
support for team-ticket amendments.122 
III.  THE POST-AMENDMENT FORMATION OF TEAM TICKETS 
Once a state has embraced team-ticket elections for its governors 
and lieutenant governors, what happens next? In most cases, be-
cause the constitutional amendments adopted did not typically ad-
dress how team-ticket elections would be conducted, legislatures 
were required to pass some form of enabling act. Part III picks up 
where Part I left off and explores how states initially, and subse-
quently, structured their team-ticket elections. Part III.A. tells the 
chronological history of how team-ticket enabling statutes were 
adopted. Part III.B. then identifies, to the greatest extent possible, 
the arguments made in favor of the various modes of team-ticket 
formation. Part III.C. then reviews the state-level experiences with 
each of the methods of team-ticket formation, responding where ap-
propriate to the arguments raised in the previous parts. Finally, Part 
III.D. concludes by extracting from this legislative history an as-yet-
unreported trend in state election law—the trend away from separate 
primaries and toward post-primary selection. 
A. Enabling Acts, Subsequent Modifications, and Other Post-
amendment History 
Following the electorate’s ratification of a constitutional amend-
ment providing for team tickets, most legislatures were tasked with 
operationalizing the amendments’ requirements into set procedures. 
In a handful of cases, the ratification of new constitutions or consti-
tutional amendments completed the process outright.123 Because the 
newly adopted constitutional provisions set out a clear procedure for 
nominating governors and lieutenant governors to create a joint 
ticket, no statutory codification or enabling act was required. The 
1963 Michigan Constitution and New Jersey’s Question 1 in 2005 
both made clear, for example, that the governor would select the 
lieutenant governor after the primary.124 The 1968 Florida 
 
 122 Supra Part II.A. 
 123 See infra text accompanying notes 124–26. 
 124 See MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21 (1963); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4 
(amended 2005). 
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Constitution, Maryland’s Question 1 in 1970, and the 1972 Montana 
Constitution provided that gubernatorial candidates would select 
their running mates before the primary and would, thus, be jointly 
nominated.125 In a similar regard, the ratification of South Dakota’s 
Amendment 2 in 1972 required no enabling act because, under then-
existing state law, lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates were nomi-
nated at state party conventions, a practice that continued thereaf-
ter.126 
And in Iowa and Kentucky, enabling acts were enacted before 
the amendments were passed.127 Both state legislatures, after ap-
proving the constitutional amendments, also approved legislation 
that was contingent on the amendments’ passage, as mentioned pre-
viously, which allowed the subsequent debate over the amendments’ 
efficacy to play out with tangible stakes.128 In Iowa, state legislators 
approved legislation allowing gubernatorial nominees to select their 
running mates after winning the primary.129 In Kentucky, guberna-
torial candidates were required to run with lieutenant-gubernatorial 
candidates in the same primary.130 
But for every other state, the constitutional adoption of a team-
ticket requirement did little to practically implement the new sys-
tem. Accordingly, state legislatures enacted legislation that set out 
specific team-ticket formation procedures.131 Most states opted for 
separate primaries for gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial 
 
 125 MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1972); H.J. Res. 1-2X, 41st Leg., Extraordinary 
Sess., 1967–68 Fla. Laws 536; H.B. 3, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1970 Md. Laws 
1298. 
 126 See Act of Mar. 15, 1965, ch. 86, 1965 S.D. Laws 197 (“After perfecting 
its organization, the convention shall . . . nominate candidates for . . . Lieutenant 
Governor . . . .”). 
 127 Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809, 818; Act of Apr. 
27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166. 
 128 See Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809, 818; Act of 
Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166 (“This section applies only if the 
constitutional amendment contained in Senate Joint Resolution 1* is adopted by 
the qualified electors of this state in the general election in 1988.”). 
 129 Act of Apr. 27, 1988, ch. 1121, 1988 Iowa Laws 166. 
 130 Act of Apr. 9, 1992, § 14, ch. 288, 1992 Ky. Laws 809. 
 131 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May 
18, 1973, ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978 
Ohio Laws 233. 
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candidates.132 Only Kansas, Minnesota, and Ohio differed.133 In 
these states, gubernatorial candidates were required to run in parti-
san primaries with lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates, and the joint 
winners of the primary would continue as the party’s nominees in 
the general election.134 
Following the adoption of these initial procedures, several states 
amended them fairly significantly. Between 1981 and 2018, eight 
states adopted different procedures a total of nine times.135 In 1981, 
for example, Indiana changed from a system of separate primaries—
which had been used in the 1976 and 1980 gubernatorial elections—
to one in which the gubernatorial nominee selected their running 
mate after the primary.136 The same year, North Dakota—which had 
used separate primaries for the same gubernatorial elections as Indi-
ana—adopted a new nominating system in which gubernatorial can-
didates ran with lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates pre-desig-
nated.137 In 1994, Utah similarly moved from a separate-primaries 
selection system to a pre-primary selection system.138 And in 1997, 
Indiana reverted from post-primary selection to pre-primary selec-
tion.139 
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, a small trend has devel-
oped in favor of post-primary selection. Florida adopted a 
 
 132 See Methods of Election, supra note 4 (listing states that continue to use 
separate primary systems). 
 133 Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May 18, 1973, 
ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978 Ohio Laws 
233. 
 134 Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 153, 1973 Kan. Laws 538; Act of May 18, 1973, 
ch. 318, 1973 Minn. Laws 630; Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 115, 1978 Ohio Laws 
233. 
 135 Act of Apr. 21, 1981, Pub. L. No. 12, 1981 Ind. Laws 301; Act of Apr. 6, 
1981, ch. 241, 1981 N.D. Laws 542; Act of Jan. 27, 1994, ch. 1, 1994 Utah Laws 
61; Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 3, 1997 Ind. Laws 651; Steve Liewer, In-
dependents Hope to Level Playing Field, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, 
Fla.), Sept. 28, 1998, at 4B; Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 
2027; Leg. Res. 14CA, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1999 Neb. Laws 156-57; Act of 
Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 118.126 (2020). 
 136 Act of Apr. 21, 1981, Pub. L. No. 12, 1981 Ind. Laws 301. 
 137 Act of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 241, 1981 N.D. Laws 542. 
 138 Act of Jan. 27, 1994, ch. 1, 1994 Utah Laws 61. 
 139 Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 3, 1997 Ind. Laws 651. 
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constitutional amendment in 1998 that, among many other election-
law changes, dropped the requirement in the state’s 1968 constitu-
tion that gubernatorial candidates run with running mates in the pri-
mary.140 In 2000, Colorado and Nebraska each adopted similar 
changes—Colorado statutorily and Nebraska by virtue of a consti-
tutional amendment.141 The South Carolina Legislature also adopted 
post-primary selection in its 2018 enabling act for the 2012 consti-
tutional amendment that tied gubernatorial and lieutenant-guberna-
torial elections.142 And finally, in 2020, the Kentucky Legislature 
made the same change.143 The only exception in the past two dec-
ades to this mini-trend has been Illinois, which in 2010, ditched its 
separate-primaries requirement in favor of a pre-primary selection 
procedure.144 
B. State Experiences with Different Methods of Ticket 
Formation 
Despite the base similarity between states with team tickets, dif-
ferences in team-ticket formation have resulted in significantly dif-
ferent outcomes. This Part reviews the state experiences with each 
of the three different methods of ticket formation, focusing on the 
patterns of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection and challenges that 
have arisen. 
First, states with post-primary lieutenant-gubernatorial selection 
have seen selection practices that don’t significantly differ from the 
selection procedure used by presidential candidates. Like presiden-
tial candidates,145 they aim for ticket-balancing characteristics, like 
geography, gender, race, age, ideology, and a balance between po-
litical insiders and outsiders.146 (And, like presidential nominees, 
 
 140 See Liewer, supra note 135. 
 141 Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2027; Leg. Res. 14CA, 
96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1999 Neb. Laws 156–57. 
 142 Act of Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331. 
 143 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.126 (2020). 
 144 Act of July 12, 2010, Pub. Act 96-1018, 2010 Ill. Laws 3736. 
 145 Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, The “Veepstakes”: Strategic Choice in 
Presidential Running Mate Selection, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 855, 860 (1997). 
 146 See, e.g., Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 305 (concluding that, 
when lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates are selected by gubernatorial nominee, 
women are more likely to be represented on the ticket); Michael D. Martinez, 
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they frequently select former opponents for their party’s nomina-
tion.)147 In these states, after winning their party’s nomination, each 
gubernatorial nominee selects a lieutenant-gubernatorial nomi-
nee.148 The time at which running mates are selected makes it pos-
sible, and likely advantageous, for the gubernatorial nominee to 
choose a former opponent for the job. In some cases, depending on 
state law, gubernatorial nominees might even be able to choose 
members of the other party149—an option repeatedly considered, but 
never used, at the national level.150 
Second, in states where gubernatorial candidates make pre-pri-
mary running-mate selections, the selection criteria are much the 
same. Candidates in these states have a slightly smaller universe 
 
Gubernatorial Tickets in Primary Elections, 1983–1986, 21 STATE & LOCAL 
GOV’T REV. 84, 86–87 (1989). These studies—and a handful of others—notwith-
standing, little attention in political science has focused on the selection of lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial candidates. 
 147 See, e.g., James Call, Andrew Gillum Picks Chris King as Running Mate 
for Governor Matchup with DeSantis/Nunez, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Sept. 6, 
2018, 7:39 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/09/06/andrew-
gillum-picks-chris-king-lieutenant-governor-running-mate/1210356002/ (noting 
that 2018 Florida Democratic gubernatorial nominee Andrew Gillum chose Chris 
King, who lost 2018 Democratic primary, as his running mate). 
 148 See, e.g., Act of June 3, 2000, ch. 387, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2027; Act 
of Mar. 15, 2018, Act No. 142, 2018 S.C. Laws 1331. 
 149 E.g., Dana Ferguson, Billie Sutton Names Running Mate Right Before SD 
Democratic Party Meet in Sioux Falls, ARGUS-LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.) (June 
14, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2018/
06/14/billie-sutton-announce-running-mate-thursday-sioux-falls/699600002/ 
(noting that Billie Sutton, Democratic nominee for Governor of South Dakota in 
2018, chose Michelle Lavallee, a Republican, as his running mate); see T. Quinn 
Yeargain, Getting the Dream Team on the Ballot: The Legality of Bipartisan Gu-
bernatorial Tickets, 2021 MICH. STATE L. REV. (forthcoming October 2021). But 
see Marc Caputo, ‘Millions of Dollars Committed’: Murphy Enters New Phase of 
Bipartisan Bid with Jolly, POLITICO (May 17, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.po-
litico.com/states/florida/story/2018/05/17/millions-of-dollars-committed-mur-
phy-enters-new-phase-of-bipartisan-bid-with-jolly-424566 (noting that Florida 
law is unclear on legality of a bipartisan gubernatorial ticket). 
 150 Matthew Rozsa, What if John McCain Had Picked Joe Lieberman in 
2008?, SALON (Sept. 8, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/09/08/
what-if-john-mccain-had-picked-joe-lieberman-in-2008/; Arlette Saenz & Sarah 
Mucha, Joe Biden Says He Would Consider a Republican for His Running Mate, 
CNN (Dec. 30, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/30/politics/joe-
biden-running-mate-republican/index.html. 
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from which they can select a running mate, but they nevertheless 
seek out candidates who can similarly balance the ticket.151 Al-
though it is possible to choose someone who had previously sought 
the party’s nomination for governor,152 the practical effect of candi-
date filing deadlines means the previous rival-turned-running mate 
would need to end their campaign prior to appearing on a ballot. 
Third, states with separate primaries for governor and lieutenant 
governor are less likely to produce balanced tickets,153 likely be-
cause the ticket is being formed naturally, with little outside influ-
ence and no specific design. It’s theoretically possible for presump-
tive gubernatorial nominees (or those unopposed in their party’s pri-
mary) to exert their influence in the lieutenant-gubernatorial pri-
mary, but these efforts are not guaranteed success. One of the few 
instances in which this influence played out publicly154 was in the 
2006 Pennsylvania lieutenant-gubernatorial Democratic primary, in 
which Lieutenant Governor Catherine Baker Knoll was seeking re-
nomination in a contested primary.155 Joe Hoeffel, who had repre-
sented suburban Philadelphia in Congress before unsuccessfully 
running for the U.S. Senate in 2004, considered challenging Baker 
Knoll in the primary.156 Incumbent Governor Ed Rendell, however, 
 
 151 See Martinez, supra note 146, at 86–87. 
 152 E.g., Jessie Balmert, Mike DeWine to Name Jon Husted as Running Mate, 
CIN. ENQUIRER (Nov. 29, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.cincin-
nati.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/29/unity-ticket-mike-dewine-name-jon-
husted-running-mate/907479001/; Seth A. Richardson, Richard Cordray and 
Betty Sutton Announce Joint Ohio Gubernatorial Ticket, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 
10, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2018/01/richard_cordray_and_
betty_sutt.html. 
 153 E.g., Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 297–98 (“[G]ubernatorial 
appointment produces women nominees more often [for lieutenant governor] than 
does primary election.”). 
 154 In 2018, it was reported that incumbent Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf 
successfully worked behind the scenes to defeat his Lieutenant Governor, Michael 
Stack, in the Democratic primary by informally backing a candidate from a dif-
ferent region of the state. See Christine Vendel, Pa. Lt. Gov Mike Stack Lost Pri-
mary Race Because of Geography, Not Scandals: Spokesman, PENNLIVE.COM 
(May 16, 2018), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2018/05/pa_lt_gov_mike_
stack_john_fett.html. 
 155 Amy Worden, Hoeffel Relents on Lieutenant Governor Race, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 9, 2006, at B1, B6. 
 156 Id. 
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pressured Hoeffel not to challenge Baker Knoll in the primary.157 
Rendell persuaded Hoeffel that the ticket needed to be geograph-
ically balanced and that the combination of Rendell, the former 
Mayor of Philadelphia, and Baker Knoll, from Pittsburgh, ade-
quately balanced the ticket.158 It is also significantly harder, al-
though theoretically possible in limited circumstances,159 for a team 
ticket of former rivals to merge in states with separate primaries. 
Outside of these rare public insider-driven efforts to balance a 
ticket, individual voters casting ballots in each primary may well 
seek to “balance” their ballot by choosing candidates with different 
backgrounds,160 but they are certainly under no obligation to do so. 
Moreover, the results of one election—which primary voters cannot 
possibly know beforehand—seem as though they would affect vot-
ers’ choice in the second election. That is, if voters knew that they 
were choosing a running mate for a specific gubernatorial nominee, 
and not choosing a lieutenant-gubernatorial nominee in the abstract, 
they might vote differently. 
Gubernatorial nominees’ loss of control over the composition of 
their ticket extends beyond the inability to balance—it can, how-
ever, also stick gubernatorial nominees with controversial running 
mates and no obvious way to replace them on the ticket.161 The most 
prominent example of this occurred in Illinois in 1986, when former 
U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson III won the Democratic primary for 
governor and Mark Fairchild won the primary for lieutenant gover-
nor.162 Fairchild’s nomination caused a significant amount of con-
troversy, given that he was a member of the LaRouche movement, 
an ideologically extreme, cult-like movement.163 Refusing to run on 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 E.g., Anne Hillman, Walker, Mallott Form Unity Ticket to Oppose Parnell, 
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.alaskapublic.org/
2014/09/02/walker-mallott-form-unity-ticket-to-oppose-parnell/. 
 160 See Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 294 (noting that “the voting 
public’s explicit demand for gender balance in nominations is often weak”). 
 161 See Andrew H. Malcolm, 2 Conservative Extremists Upset Democrats in 
the Illinois Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1986), https://www.ny-
times.com/1986/03/20/us/2-conservative-extremists-upset-democrats-in-the-illi-
nois-primary.html. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
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the same ticket with Fairchild, Stevenson surrendered the Demo-
cratic nomination for governor and instead founded the Illinois Sol-
idarity Party, which effectively replaced the Democratic Party in the 
1986 election.164 
A similar event took place in 2010, also in Illinois, when incum-
bent Governor Pat Quinn won the Democratic gubernatorial primary 
and businessman Scott Lee Cohen won the lieutenant-gubernatorial 
primary.165 Shortly after Cohen won the primary, media attention 
focused on past allegations of domestic abuse levied against him, 
and Quinn apparently moved behind the scenes to have Cohen with-
draw.166 Cohen did so shortly thereafter, and the legislature 
promptly moved to toss its system of separate primaries, instead re-
quiring gubernatorial candidates to pick running mates before the 
primary.167 
In opposing constitutional amendments for team-ticket guberna-
torial elections, as mentioned previously, some politicians argued 
that team-ticket elections would produce unqualified, incompetent 
candidates for lieutenant governor.168 It is ironic that these argu-
ments were correct—but only with respect to lieutenant-gubernato-
rial candidates selected by voters in primaries, the method of lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial selection closest to the pre-team-ticket method. 
It, instead, seems to be the case that, as the party’s control over the 
process increases, more qualified candidates—and specifically 
those who are likelier to balance the ticket—are selected. 
C. The Rationale Behind These Changes 
In embracing different methods of team-ticket formation—espe-
cially pre- and post-primary selection—many state legislators artic-
ulated arguments similar to those made in support of team-ticket 
 
 164 See Karl D. Cooper, Note, Are State-Imposed Political Party Primaries 
Constitutional? The Constitutional Ramifications of the 1986 Illinois LaRouche 
Primary Victories, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 343, 348–54 (1987–88). 
 165 John Patterson & Joseph Ryan, Quinn Hints at Replacement for Running 
Mate, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.) (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.dai-
lyherald.com/article/20100205/news/302059951/. 
 166 Id.; Amanda Vinicky, Illinois’ Storied History of Choosing Its Second-in-
Command, NPR ILL. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nprillinois.org/post/illinois-
storied-history-choosing-its-second-command. 
 167 Vinicky, supra note 166. 
 168 Single Ballot Amendment up to Voters, supra note 18. 
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elections. Policymakers focused on ensuring that governors and 
lieutenant governors would have positive, constructive relation-
ships, suggesting that allowing gubernatorial candidates to pick lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial candidates would make such relationships like-
lier.169 These relationships, in turn, would allow governors to feel 
comfortable delegating additional responsibilities to their lieutenant 
governors.170 In some cases, observers perceived these moves as re-
sponses to chilly relationships between governors and lieutenant 
governors who had been nominated in separate primaries171—and in 
this context, the protestations of legislators and governors that this 
wasn’t the motivation seemed particularly insincere.172 These argu-
ments, which are rooted in the desire to create a cohesive state ex-
ecutive branch, echo the arguments made in favor of adopting team-
ticket constitutional amendments.173 
Outside of the cohesion that deliberate selection of running ma-
tes would foster, legislators frequently argued that the selection pro-
cess would produce higher-quality running mates.174 For example, 
in Indiana, backers of a post-primary selection process suggested 
that requiring lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates to run in primaries 
forced them to fundraise, which they were not able to do well.175 
Similarly, in Nebraska, the author of a constitutional amendment 
 
 169 See e.g., Amendment 1, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 2, 2000, at 19X; Constitu-
tional Change Bill Approved in House, ST. CLOUD TIMES, Apr. 17, 1973, at 5; 
Tom Diemer, Rhodes Signs Industrial Tax Abatement Bill, MARION STAR, Dec. 
10, 1977, at 2; Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, DAILY REP. 
(Greenfield, Ind.), Apr. 24, 1981, at 4. 
 170 E.g., Lt. Gov. Candidates Won’t Run Campaigns, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand 
Junction, Colo.), Feb. 16, 2000, at 10; Martha Stoddard, Three Issues Are Getting 
Little Notice, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 3, 2000, at 7. 
 171 See, e.g., Foley, supra note 118; Owens Says Rogers Would Top List of 
Potential Running Mates, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction, Colo.), June 6, 2000, 
at 3. 
 172 E.g., Lt. Gov. Candidates Won’t Run Campaigns, supra note 170 (“[Rep-
resentatives] Sinclair and McPherson both have said that public conflicts between 
Gov. Bill Owens and Lt. Gov. Joe Rogers did not prompt them to introduce their 
measures.”); Owens Says Rogers Would Top List of Potential Running Mates, su-
pra note 171 (“‘This bill was not Bill Owens trying to put aside Joe Rogers,’ the 
governor said Monday.”). 
 173 Compare supra notes 169–70, with supra notes 104–05. 
 174 See, e.g., Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note 
169; Stoddard, supra note 170. 
 175 See Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note 169. 
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abolishing separate primaries noted that, in watching lieutenant-gu-
bernatorial candidates launch campaigns in the 1998 election, he 
saw “candidates waging expensive advertising wars, in which they 
made overstated claims about what they would do.”176 
The implication behind these arguments was perhaps that the af-
firmative requirement of launching a campaign, fundraising, and 
generating a campaign platform both discouraged qualified candi-
dates from running and created an electoral process that incentivized 
wealthier candidates, or those with better connections and fundrais-
ing abilities, over others. This argument was made more explicitly 
in Colorado, where supporters of post-primary selection noted that 
removing the separate-primary requirement would allow more po-
litical outsiders to be selected as running mates.177 And the most 
significant advantage of post-primary selection over pre-primary se-
lection—the ability of nominees to pick former competitors as run-
ning mates—was raised as states considered efforts to adopt post-
primary selection procedures.178 
Despite the fact that either pre- or post-primary selection would 
create a process more similar to presidential elections, few argu-
ments were explicitly made to that effect.179 The absence of such 
arguments, which were not-infrequently raised during the adoption 
of team-ticket constitutional amendments,180 is an interesting omis-
sion. It perhaps suggests that, although states were concerned with 
creating a process similar to presidential elections in the first place, 
their adoption of specific procedures actually reflected state-specific 
 
 176 Stoddard, supra note 170. 
 177 See Peter Blake, Bill Lets Gubernatorial Candidates Pick Running Mates, 
DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction, Colo.), Feb. 16, 2000, at 4 (suggesting that bill 
would allow outsiders to be involved in process). 
 178 E.g., Bill Would Change Pick of Lieutenant Governor, MUNCIE STAR 
PRESS, Jan. 15, 1981, at 10 (“Townsend . . . said the proposed change would allow 
the nominee to pick one of his primary foes as a running mate . . . .’ This would 
be very similar to the way in which we chose our president and vice president,’ 
he said. ‘I think it would be a very worthwhile change.’”); Liewer, supra note 135 
(describing how candidates for governor would be allowed “to run in the primary 
without choosing a running mate [for lieutenant governor], deferring a choice un-
til after the primary so the winner could choose one of the losing candidates.”). 
 179 But see Bill Would Change Pick of Lieutenant Governor, supra note 178; 
Stoddard, supra note 170. 
 180 See supra notes 89, 109, and accompanying discussion. 
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concerns and was rooted in the historical differences between pres-
idential and gubernatorial elections. 
Few explicit arguments were made for separate primaries—
chiefly because few states affirmatively adopted these procedures 
after ratifying team-ticket constitutional amendments. In many 
cases, pre-existing election-law procedures, which obviously pro-
vided for separate primaries, continued in force, modified slightly 
by the force of the constitutional amendments.181 Nevertheless, ar-
guments were made in defense of separate-primary nominating pro-
cedures as other procedures were considered. These arguments, 
which emphasized the importance of the popular, democratic sup-
port for lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates182 and suggested that 
another procedure would allow behind-the-scenes selection of run-
ning mates,183 actually sound similar to the arguments made against 
the adoption of team-ticket constitutional amendments.184 
Ultimately, however, the debates surrounding these proposals 
took place in something of a vacuum. To the extent that voters crys-
tallized these proposals by approving the constitutional amend-
ments, little opposition to them developed and public attention was 
largely focused on other aspects of the proposed amendments.185 
And if adopted as statutory amendments, the bills were usually ap-
proved with large, bipartisan majorities.186 
D. Identifying the Trend 
The adoption of team-ticket constitutional amendments by New 
York in 1953 inaugurated a new majority rule for gubernatorial 
 
 181 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 15, 1965, ch. 86, 1965 S.D. Laws 197. 
 182 See Diemer, supra note 169; Editorial, Election Preview, BANNER-PRESS 
(David City, Neb.), Oct. 19, 2000, at 24; Foley, supra note 118; Orr Favors Pick-
ing Lt. Governor Via Convention, supra note 169. 
 183 See Diemer, supra note 169; Orr Favors Picking Lt. Governor Via Con-
vention, supra note 169. 
 184 Compare supra notes 120–21 and accompanying discussion, with supra 
notes 91–94 and accompanying discussion. 
 185 See, e.g., Amendment 1, supra note 169 (“No organized opposition to the 
amendment has emerged . . . .”); Liewer, supra note 135 (largely discussing open-
primary aspect of Florida’s Amendment 11, not post-primary selection of lieuten-
ant-gubernatorial nominees). 
 186 See, e.g., Tandem Primary Given Final OK, MANSFIELD NEWS-J., Dec. 7, 
1977, at 17. 
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elections. Today, most states with lieutenant governors elect their 
governors and lieutenant governors on a team ticket.187 But, as the 
foregoing discussion makes clear, the adoption of team-ticket elec-
tions necessitated another decision by state legislators—specifi-
cally, how to implement the new electoral process. 
Although most states initially adopted, either affirmatively or as 
the result of pre-existing requirements, separate primaries, a clear 
trend has developed away from separate primaries and toward pre- 
or post-primary selection of running mates by gubernatorial nomi-
nees. There are several ways to visualize this trend. First, we can 
consider how state constitutional amendments adopting team-ticket 
requirements were drafted. The later amendments are likelier than 
the first amendments to provide for the pre- or post-primary nomi-
nation of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees.188 Of the first ten states 
to enact such amendments, eight still require separate primaries.189 
Similarly, of the last ten states to enact such amendments, every one 
forms team tickets either before or after primaries—none do so with 
separate primaries.190 
Second, we can consider how states drafted enabling acts. The 
first constitutional amendments were likelier to be followed up with 
separate-primary requirements than more recently ratified amend-
ments.191 Third, we can look to what the most recent changes to lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial selection have entailed. No state has transi-
tioned from pre- or post-primary selection to separate primaries, but 
six states have done the reverse.192 
But under the hood, there’s another, albeit less discernible, trend 
taking place. In recent decades, states have increasingly adopted the 
post-primary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees. Al-
most all of the states that currently employ post-primary selection 
have implemented their procedure in the last two decades: Iowa 
(1988); Florida (1998); Colorado and Nebraska (2000); New Jersey 
 
 187 Methods of Election, supra note 4. 
 188 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text; see also Methods of Elec-
tion, supra note 4. 
 189 See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text; see also Methods of Elec-
tion, supra note 4. 
 190 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Methods of Election, 
supra note 4. 
 191 See supra Part III.A. 
 192 See supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text. 
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(2005); South Carolina (2018); and Kentucky (2020).193 Before this 
period, the only states with post-primary selection were Indiana, 
which had post-primary selection from 1981–97; Michigan, which 
adopted post-primary selection in its 1963 constitution; and South 
Dakota, which effectively nominated its lieutenant-gubernatorial 
candidates post-primary anyway.194 
Significantly, the states that have embraced post-primary selec-
tion of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees have not done so after try-
ing and rejecting each of the previous methods; accordingly, their 
systems do not reflect a rejection of the other methods as much as 
they represent an endorsement of their own specific method. The 
adoption of these changes has reflected a concrete desire to ensure 
that the relationships between the gubernatorial and lieutenant-gu-
bernatorial nominees—and thus governors and lieutenant gover-
nors—remain positive and to guarantee that governors can have a 
junior governing partner of their choosing with as few restrictions 
as possible. 
IV.  IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL TEAM TICKET 
The two separate trends identified in this Article—first, the trend 
toward team-ticket elections and, second, the trend toward pre- and 
post-primary running-mate selection—make clear that states are 
seeking to modernize their gubernatorial elections in a democrati-
cally optimal way. The past rigidity of gubernatorial elections, usu-
ally for short terms, without lieutenant governors, and with a rele-
gated role in the state system of government, has been largely aban-
doned. 
But, in adopting team-ticket gubernatorial elections, which 
method of ticket formation is the best? This Part argues that the three 
different methods do not have equal merits and demerits to them. 
Instead, while pre- and post-primary selection each have mutually 
exclusive advantages and are roughly equal in their practical opera-
tion, separate primaries represent an archaic form of selection that 
makes little sense in the realm of team-ticket formation. 
 
 193 See supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
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Based on the available legislative history identified in the previ-
ous parts, Part IV.A. extracts two philosophies underlying the adop-
tion of team tickets: (1) efficiency in the state executive branch and 
(2) maximization of democratic legitimacy and voter intent. Part 
IV.B. then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method of team-ticket formation with these philosophies in mind, 
ultimately concluding that separate primaries should be abolished. 
A. The Philosophy of Team-Ticket Elections 
Both advocates and opponents of team-ticket constitutional 
amendments made arguments rooted in ideals of democracy and the 
republic. Advocates argued that the election of governors and lieu-
tenant governors of different parties made possible a gubernatorial 
succession that radically reshaped state politics, likely in a way not 
intended by voters.195 They argued that a cohesive executive 
branch—in which the governor and lieutenant governor got along, 
worked together, and sought to advance a joint legislative agenda—
made for better government.196 Implicit in their argument was the 
idea that voters should voluntarily surrender their power to elect 
governors and lieutenant governors of different parties because do-
ing so—while nominally undemocratic—would more practically 
advance democracy. 
These arguments sound quite similar to the arguments made by 
“short ballot” advocates during the Progressive era.197 The “short 
ballot” movement “reflected both a cynical and realistic view of how 
elections were conducted—there are so many elections that take 
place and so many positions voted on at each election that voters 
don’t know what they’re voting for.”198 Accordingly, the movement 
sought to reduce the number of offices elected by voters and to 
“make politics so simple that what the average citizen knows will be 
all there is to know.”199 
Although short-ballot advocates apparently did not argue for the 
adoption of team-ticket elections, they usually sought to preserve 
 
 195 See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
 196 See id. 
 197 See Yeargain, Legal History, supra note 108, at 623–24. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Richard S. Childs, The Short Ballot Movement and Simplified Politics, 64 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 168, 169 (1916). 
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the lieutenant governorship as an elected office, even as they advo-
cated for the appointment of otherwise-elected statewide officers.200 
The root of the argument is similar: Voters are generally familiar 
with the major-party nominees for governor but not many other of-
fices and, accordingly, they cast their ballots with little information 
at their disposal.201 In separately electing lieutenant governors, it is 
unsurprising that few voters have access to information about lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial candidates.202 Accordingly, the original advo-
cates of team-ticket gubernatorial elections sought, as short-ballot 
advocates did half a century prior, to persuade voters to give up 
some of their voting power in exchange for a more competently run 
and efficient government.203 
Opponents, meanwhile, leaned much more heavily on argu-
ments favoring “pure” democracy.204 They cast doubt on the ability 
of political parties or gubernatorial nominees to select lieutenant-
gubernatorial candidates as effectively as the voters could, fre-
quently invoking loaded imagery of smoke-filled rooms and 
 
 200 See, e.g., Fourteen Governors Urge Short Ballot, SHORT BALLOT BULL., 
Feb. 1915, at 3 (describing support for an elected lieutenant governor position by 
Michigan Governor Woodbridge Ferris, a short-ballot advocate); Short Ballot 
Gaining Favor, SHORT BALLOT BULL., Aug. 1916, at 4 (same with respect to Kan-
sas short-ballot advocates); “Stage Coach” Government, SHORT BALLOT BULL., 
Apr. 1915, at 14 (same with respect to New York short-ballot advocates). But see 
Would Abolish Lieutenant Governor, SHORT BALLOT BULL., Feb. 1915, at 9 (de-
scribing proposal of California short-ballot advocates to abolish the lieutenant 
governorship). 
 201 As Richard Childs put it: 
Ask Mr. Average Citizen as he emerges from the polling booth 
whom he voted for for state treasurer and he will not have the 
slightest idea. He voted for the Republican, whoever that was. 
He expressed no opinion of his own for the simple reason that 
he had no opinion to express. Mr. Average Citizen is not a pol-
itician. Why should he know anything about the state treasurer? 
Childs, supra note 199, at 168. 
 202 See, e.g., Eric Freedman & Daniel Thai, Little Newspaper Coverage for Lt. 
Governor Candidates, 27 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 82, 92 (2006) (noting that “most 
candidates for lieutenant governor were barely blips on the radar, if at all, in cap-
ital city newspapers during prime campaign season.”). 
 203 See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text; see also Yeargain, Legal 
History, supra note 108, at 623–24. 
 204 See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
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manipulated processes.205 A related argument was that lieutenant-
gubernatorial candidates would be selected because of their ability 
to help the ticket win—either through self-financing of the ticket or 
by balancing it—and not because of their competence.206 These op-
ponents contended that if a governor and lieutenant governor of dif-
ferent parties were elected, that was the electorate’s will—and if a 
governor was succeeded by a lieutenant governor of a different 
party, that was also the electorate’s will.207 At the core of these ar-
guments was an unbridled, untainted belief that the outcome favored 
by the electorate was the correct one and that efforts to impose an 
ostensibly more “efficient” outcome were illegitimate as a result.208 
These arguments contain some amount of internal inconsistency. 
After all, the idea that lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates could be 
selected in such a manner as to improve a ticket’s chances of win-
ning a general election suggests that voters want a balanced ticket. 
And the idea that doing so reduces the chances of competent candi-
dates being selected—but, again, increases the ticket’s chances—
suggests that voters may not actually be able to critically discern 
competence and effectiveness. 
It is also worth noting that many of the arguments made against 
team-ticket elections were empirical statements made without the 
benefit of empirical support. One lawmaker in Iowa suggested, for 
example, that female lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees would be 
less likely to be selected by party elites than by the voters,209 but the 
best available political science research actually suggests the oppo-
site.210 And the claims that voters might be deliberately electing 
governors and lieutenant governors of different parties—perhaps to 
“mix and match” the best candidates from both parties211—is belied 
by the fact that state electoral systems make it all too possible for 
candidates of different parties to be elected by happenstance.212 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 See, e.g., supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 208 See Cunnion, supra note 87. 
 209 Streamline Officials, Too, supra note 116. 
 210 Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 299–305. 
 211 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
 212 See Yeargain, Democratizing Gubernatorial Succession, supra note 6. 
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Moreover, to the extent that opponents of team tickets sought to 
cloak their arguments in the guise of popular will, the fact that al-
most every proposed constitutional amendment providing for team 
tickets was ratified strongly suggests that the electorate was entirely 
willing to surrender a piece of its ability to vote for a particular of-
fice. These election outcomes were not flukes—in almost all cases, 
large majorities of the electorate approved the amendments, regard-
less of whether they were presented individually, as part of an exec-
utive-branch rewrite, or as a newly drafted constitution.213 Accord-
ingly, although it is somewhat dicey to attribute the underlying phi-
losophy of the drafters of these constitutional amendments to the 
voters who approved them, it is difficult to conclude that voters ap-
proved them for any reason but trading a little bit of democracy in 
the abstract for significantly more democratic legitimacy in practice. 
It is with this philosophy in mind that we should evaluate the differ-
ent methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial selection. 
B. Evaluating Team-Ticket Election Procedures 
With the three different team-ticket methods used in roughly 
equal numbers among the states, their advantages and disadvantages 
become apparent. There is, however, little that can be noted here that 
has not been adequately covered elsewhere. The benefits and draw-
backs of each method should be fairly apparent. 
Separate primaries imbue the process of lieutenant-gubernato-
rial selection with faux democratic legitimacy. In so doing, however, 
they effectively function as a double-blind experiment in which vot-
ers select gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates to 
form a joint ticket in a vacuum, even though the selection of each 
candidate ought to be influenced by the identity of the other. (Put 
another way, how can a voter know who the ideal running mate for 
their party’s gubernatorial nominee is without knowing the identity 
of the gubernatorial nominee? And vice-versa?) Moreover, a system 
of separate primaries seems more likely to produce fraught relation-
ships between gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial 
 
 213 Supra Part I.A. 
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nominees—giving a great deal of realism to the term “shotgun mar-
riage.”214 
Post-primary selection stands diametrically opposed to separate 
primaries. In this system, voters have no direct say in the selection 
of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees.215 This does not mean that 
they have no influence in the process, however. After all, they se-
lected the gubernatorial nominee—whose decision as to a running 
mate then completes the ticket—and the nominee should be consci-
entious of how the lieutenant-gubernatorial nominee will either elec-
trify or deflate the party’s base voters. Unlike in states with the sep-
arate-primaries method, gubernatorial nominees in states with this 
method have the ability to select almost any running mate of their 
choosing.216 If they want to select a former opponent for their party’s 
nomination in an effort to unify the party, they can do so. 
Pre-primary selection occupies the space between separate pri-
maries and post-primary selection. Like separate primaries, it en-
sures that the team ticket has the explicit support of primary voters. 
And like post-primary selection, it ensures that every gubernatorial 
candidate has the ability to name a running mate of their choosing. 
But it also meaningfully differs from both of those methods. Voters 
are deprived of their ability to vote for a specific lieutenant-guber-
natorial candidate; so too are gubernatorial candidates deprived of 
their ability to pick any potential running mate. 
To some extent, the choice between methods of lieutenant-gu-
bernatorial selection, and thus team-ticket formation, presents an 
empirical question. The available political science research shows 
that when team tickets are formed by selection, not separate prima-
ries, the resulting ticket is more likely to be balanced and to have 
 
 214 See, e.g., Janesch, supra note 15; A. G. Sulzberger, Jokes and Secret Hopes 
for Lieutenant Governors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.ny-
times.com/2010/12/04/us/04lieutenant.html (generally discussing the relation-
ships between governors and lieutenant governors); David W. Winder & David 
Hill, The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor: Forms of Cooperation Between 
Two State Executives, 34 POL. & POL’Y 634, 651 (2006) (noting that, when gov-
ernors and lieutenant governors are elected separately, governors are less likely to 
give lieutenant governors policymaking responsibilities). 
 215 See supra notes 169–80 and accompanying text. 
 216 See id. 
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gender and racial equity.217 Not only that, but deliberately formed 
tickets are also likelier to result in policy cooperation between the 
elected governor and lieutenant governor.218 
More anecdotally, the spectacle of open lieutenant-gubernatorial 
elections—in which voters know little of the candidates and the can-
didates are both poorly funded and forced to make impossible cam-
paign promises—leaves much to be desired. And separate primaries 
seem to require more machinations on the part of politicians and 
powerbrokers, not less. The examples from Illinois in 1986 and 
2010, when lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates unacceptable to the 
gubernatorial nominee were nominated,219 is reflective of the unin-
tended consequences of separately nominating lieutenant governors. 
But deciding among pre- or post-primary selection presents a 
closer question. Is slightly limiting the gubernatorial candidate’s 
ability to select any possible running mate worth the marginal in-
crease in voter input on the ticket formation? In the reverse, is mar-
ginally limiting voter input worth a slight increase in the candidate’s 
ability to select any running mate? The fundamental operation of 
each system has slight advantages and disadvantages over the other. 
And, more significantly, each system might have small effects on 
how gubernatorial elections are conducted that might only matter at 
the margins. For example, pre-primary selection might force the 
number of gubernatorial candidates competing in either party’s pri-
mary to consolidate and shrink—as occurred in the 2018 Ohio gu-
bernatorial election in both primaries.220 This consolidation could 
reduce the chances that a gubernatorial candidate wins their party’s 
primary with a small plurality of the vote. Post-primary selection 
might enable candidates to make cross-party selections, opening up 
every political journalist’s fantasy scenario: a Democrat and a 
 
 217 See, e.g., Hennings & Urbatsch, supra note 116, at 299–305; Valerie M. 
Hennings & R. Urbatsch, There Can Be Only One (Woman on the Ticket): Gender 
in Candidate Nominations, 37 POL. BEHAV. 749, 762–63 (2015); Martinez, supra 
note 146, at 86–87; see also John Harold Crouch, Contemporary State Lieutenant 
Governors: An Initial Review 91–93 (Spring 2019) (unpublished M.A. disserta-
tion, California State University, Fullerton) (on file with author) (conducting em-
pirical analysis of the demographic traits of lieutenant-gubernatorial candidates 
based on election method). 
 218 See Winder & Hill, supra note 214, at 651. 
 219 See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text. 
 220 Balmert, supra note 152152; Richardson, supra note 152. 
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Republican forming a “dream team.” These suggestions represent 
unanswered empirical questions, however, and are worth addressing 
in future scholarship. 
All of this is to say that policymakers in different states, each 
operating with the same ethos and each cognizant of the philoso-
phies of democratic legitimacy and governmental efficiency under-
girding team-ticket elections, could arrive at different—and well-
reasoned—decisions. Because the merits of both pre- and post-pri-
mary selection of lieutenant-gubernatorial nominees are compelling, 
with each possessing advantages over the other, this Article does not 
seek to prescribe either one of them as an answer. Instead, consci-
entious that states are laboratories of democracy and may reach dif-
ferent conclusions, it is satisfied to set out each method’s advantages 
and disadvantages—but ultimately to urge that states pick one of 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past half-century, states have increasingly consolidated 
their gubernatorial and lieutenant-gubernatorial elections. These 
changes have been addressed sparingly in the scholarly literature 
surrounding gubernatorial elections and state constitutional law, but 
they represent a significant shift in the balance of power at the state 
level. Somewhat paradoxically, the move to team tickets seeks to 
sacrifice a small amount of direct democracy—namely, the elec-
torate’s ability to select a lieutenant governor entirely of its choos-
ing—for a larger amount of democratic legitimacy in the form of a 
democratically legitimate gubernatorial succession and the conver-
sion of the lieutenant governor to a reliable governing partner. A 
similar motivation has supported the transition to methods of lieu-
tenant-gubernatorial election that are ostensibly less democratic but 
have similar effects. 
These efforts have dramatically reshaped how gubernatorial 
elections take place in the United States. But this movement is not 
yet over. Although most states with lieutenant governors today em-
ploy methods of lieutenant-gubernatorial election that create a team 
ticket, many still do not. And in those states, some state legislatures 
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have proposed constitutional amendments that seek to make similar 
changes.221 
While there are meritorious arguments in favor of either pre- or 
post-primary selection, separate primaries are fundamentally at odds 
with the rationale underlying team-ticket gubernatorial elections. 
Accordingly, these proposed amendments ought to be adopted, and 
separate primaries ought to be abolished. 
  
 
 221 E.g., Ryan Byrne, Pennsylvania Legislature Passes Constitutional Amend-
ment to End Primaries for Lieutenant Governor, BALLOTPEDIA NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2020, 4:34 AM), https://news.ballotpedia.org/2020/01/30/pennsylvania-legisla-
ture-passes-constitutional-amendment-to-end-primaries-for-lieutenant-gover-
nor/. 
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